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Introduction 
No doubt, medical students and professionals are often motivated by the prospect of helping people 
in need. But let’s be honest, a big motivator for studying medicine is its job prospects: namely 
plenty of well-paid safe jobs. That is why medical artificial intelligence (medical AI) should scare 
you: because it is coming after your jobs.  
In this chapter we will discuss IBM Watson for Oncology (from now on just Watson for short) as a 
case study in the emergence of medical AI. We will analyse some of the most interesting ethical and 
philosophical questions raised by medical AI in general and Watson in particular. 
Watson is “a decision-support system that ranks cancer therapeutic options” (Di Nucci 2019: 1) 
based on machine learning algorithms, which are computer systems that are, according to cognitive 
scientists, able to “figure it out on their own, by making inferences from data” (Domingos 2015: xi).  
So you can double down on your fear already, dear medics: those machines are coming after your 
jobs and they are also coming after the jobs of their own programmers – that’s how greedy they are. 
They clearly won’t stop until they have taken over the whole world, which is in fact what 
2 
 
technophobes and their extremist friends, the techno-apocalypsts, are afraid of (see for example 
Tegmark 2017, especially the first chapter).1  
How does Watson work? Based on its access to up-to-date medical research publications and 
patient’s health records, Watson’s algorithm – developed by IBM engineers together with 
oncologists from the Memorial Sloan Kettering (MSK) Cancer Center in New York - generates 
cancer treatment recommendations that oncologists can review and use in consultation with 
patients.  
Here some more details on how Watson functions, from Rosalind McDougall’s recent analysis in 
the Journal of Medical Ethics: 
Watson for Oncology is designed and marketed as a tool for clinicians, to assist them to 
‘zero in on the most promising care options’ in an age where the available literature on 
cancer is huge and fast-moving. The system extracts clinical information from the 
patient’s medical record, such as gender, age, stage and type of cancer, family history, 
notes from previous visits, test results and comorbidities. The doctor is prompted to 
verify this extracted information and add additional relevant information. The 
information is then analysed, based on the computer’s training by oncologists at 
Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center in New York. The system accesses over 300 
medical journals and over 200 textbooks. According to IBM’s marketing video, Watson 
‘identifies a prioritized list of treatment options based on Memorial Sloan Kettering 
expertise and training, and provides links to supporting evidence’. Watson presents a 
ranked list of treatment options and a synthesis of the existing published evidence 
relevant to that clinical situation. The treatment options are divided into three colour-
coded sections: green for recommended treatments, amber for treatments to consider 
and red for treatments that are not recommended. There may be multiple options in each 
section. The options are ranked based on outcome statistics presented in terms of 
‘disease-free survival’. For each treatment option, there are two literature tabs available 
to the clinician. One tab gives links to literature that supports that treatment option, 
identified by Memorial Sloan Kettering clinicians. The other tab gives links to Watson-
identified literature relevant to that clinical situation. Information on toxicities 
associated with the treatment (such as vomiting, anaemia, diarrhoea and so on) is also 
available to clinicians. The system also has the capacity to be customised to the specific 
                                                          
1 There are also, it must be said, more optimistic voices, such as Eric Topol’s Deep Medicine.  
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geographic context where it is being used. For example, local clinical guidelines and 
availability of drugs are included for clinicians (McDougall 2019: 157).2 
 
Are you scared now? The kind of medical advice and recommendations that patients used to receive 
from oncologists would seem to have been delegated to computer algorithms – and intelligent ones 
at that, who can program themselves (if you believe those cognitive scientists). On a superficial 
reading, everybody should be scared: patients because their treatment is being decided by 
computers and doctors because their jobs are being outsourced away.  
Automation (Wajcman 2017, Susskind & Susskind 2015) will have come full-circle if even the 
most privileged and better paid jobs such as those in healthcare and law are lost to machine learning 
algorithms.3  
 
What’s the big deal, really? Delegation and Performance 
We are going to suggest that the above argument is too quick: that there are indeed serious ethical 
and philosophical issues to consider, but that first we need to properly analyse Watson’s tasks in 
order to be able to evaluate such innovation from an ethical point of view.  
What is it – exactly – that we are delegating to Watson? There is a big difference, for example, 
between delegating decision making to a computer system and delegating advice or – as it is said 
within this debate – ‘decision-support’ to the algorithm. And in fact given the details above about 
                                                          
2 You can see IBM’s marketing material here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8_bi-S0XNPI (accessed on 4.6.19). 
Some more details on Watson are available at the following links to recent articles in popular scientific publications: 
http://fortune.com/2018/07/27/ibm-watson-cancer/ 
https://www.statnews.com/2018/07/25/ibm-watson-recommended-unsafe-incorrect-treatments/ 
https://www.engadget.com/2017/06/01/ibm-watson-cancer-treatment-plans/?guccounter=1 
3 And in fact you will be relieved to know that it’s not just medics, lawyers are under threat too (Fry 2018).  
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the functioning of Watson, it would look like that what we are delegating is decision-support 
instead of decision-making. As in, Watson comes in to support the clinician’s decision-making 
rather than to do its own decision-making instead of, or on behalf of, the oncologist. At least in 
theory, then, the decision-making capacity and, crucially, authority still rests with the clinician, 
together with patients. However, it is worth noting that Watson is in fact designed so as to come up 
with solutions to the task that it is said to support humans in solving.  The way Watson is to support 
the human experts’ decision about which treatments to recommend is in part by itself coming up 
with a prioritized list of treatment recommendations. This means that, at least in theory, there is 
continuum of usages of Watson starting with letting Watson having very little say in the human 
decision making and ending with giving Watson full control over the decision about which 
treatment to recommend the patient. In practice, these possible usages mean that we are constantly 
faced with the question of how far we are willing to go in our delegation of tasks to Watson. 
The simple theoretical consideration above – with its distinction between decision-making and 
decision-support and its application to Watson’s case – shows that our analysis needs to be 
structured in ways that are a bit more sophisticated than the superficial technophobic skepticism 
with which we started.  
Let us try breaking our analysis down into the following questions: 
1) What could be the potential reasons for delegating respectively decision-support and 
decision-making to Watson?  
2) How good is Watson’s performance and how can we measure the performance level of 
Watson both in absolute terms and in comparison to human clinicians?  
3) Are there risks in using Watson that are independent of problems concerning how to 
measure Watson’s performance level? 
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4) Finally, which tasks are we – ethically – allowed to delegate to Watson and which ought we, 
again from an ethical point of view, to keep for humans?4  
 
This last question #4 is the overall question that we need to answer in providing an ethical analysis 
of our Watson case study; and in order to do that, it will be necessary to first address the other three 
questions – and some further ones along the way. This is what we turn to now, starting from 
Question #1.  
 
Question #1: delegating what, why and to whom?  
As question #1 suggests, control is a big part of the ethical equation when it comes to Watson: 
healthcare is too precious – especially when it comes to life and death decision-making such as in 
the context of oncology – to lose control to algorithms such as Watson. How much control we 
should want – in every context – depends on how much we care and should care. And we do care 
and should care a lot about cancer, both because it kills people and because progress within cancer 
research can save many lives – recent statistics say that every second person alive today will 
experience cancer within their lifetime but that – at the same time – half of those will survive it.5 So 
it matters. And therefore we don’t want to lose (human) control.6  Applied to our case, this 
reasoning should make us reluctant to put machines in control of the actual decision making 
concerning which treatment we should recommend to a particular patient.  
                                                          
4 Here note the classic ethical distinction between being morally allowed to do something and being morally obliged to 
do something. See Di Nucci (2018, Chapter 3) for more on this distinction.  
5 Here some more precise numbers from Cancer UK, for example: 
https://www.cancerresearchuk.org/health-professional/cancer-statistics/risk/lifetime-risk 
6 See Santoni & Van der Hoven (2018) for a philosophical analysis of the notion of ”meaningful human control”. See 
Grote & Di Nucci (forthcoming) for more on the importance of the issue of control in debates about algorithmic 
decision-making. 
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One possible objection to this conclusion is that we shouldn’t a priori rule out any kind of 
delegation of control to an AI-system, since the loss of control might be outweighed by the fact that 
the AI-system compared with the best human experts improves the performance of the relevant 
tasks significantly. This is a fair objection but as formulated here it is in need of clarification.  
We need to take a closer look at what improved performance can even mean in the particular 
context of Watson, because there are at least two different ways in which such technological 
systems can provide enhanced performance. 
On the one hand, the system to which we delegate a task that was previously performed by a human 
can do a better job than the human (ever, maybe?) could. This is what we call strategic delegation, 
where we delegate to someone or something else because they are supposed to be better; they are – 
if you like – the experts. Strategic delegation happens not just between humans and technological 
systems but especially between different human agents, such as when we delegate to the plumber 
repairing piping in our kitchen.  
In the case of Watson, we find IBM stressing a specifically strategic reason for using Watson when 
they in their promotion material write as follows: “With the ability to read over 200 million pages in 
three seconds, IBM Watson® for Oncology is learning the language of oncology and detecting 
patterns that humans may not have seen.”7  Here it is suggested that Watson has an ability to detect 
patterns relevant for treatment that exceeds that of human experts and this is one way in which the 
theoretical idea of strategic delegation could apply to Watson.  
There is an alternative to strategic delegation, which we refer to as economic delegation: that’s 
when we delegate some task to someone else or something else not because we believe that they 
will be better at it than ourselves (or anyway the previous person or system tasked with it) but 
                                                          
7 https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/AONROW12 
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because we believe that it is more resources-efficient to delegate the task; cleaning is a 
straightforward example of this, where a lot of economically privileged people do not necessarily 
delegate cleaning because they believe that they wouldn’t be as capable of doing it (even though 
they wouldn’t, actually) but because they, in short, can’t be bothered – which is a not very nice way 
of saying that they believe that it is more resources-efficient for them to delegate cleaning to 
someone else. Generally speaking, having a strategic reason for delegating a certain task does not 
necessarily depend on enhancing the quality of the performance of that specific task but on whether 
the delegation will save a given system (e.g. the health care system) resources, in a way that allows 
an optimization of the system’s overall performance.  
 
How does economic delegation apply to Watson? Instead of thinking that Watson can do things 
better than human oncologists can, we could alternatively argue that human oncologists – as 
stressed and pressed for time as they are - can be freed up for more meaningful tasks by having 
Watson scan medical literature. So that the expensive and limited time of human oncologists can – 
through the use of Watson – be deployed more efficiently – and then doctors might end up having 
more time for patients, for example. It is such an economic reason that IBM provides when they say 
as follows: “Recent studies continue to demonstrate that Watson for Oncology ‘agrees’ with 
physicians around the world in the vast majority of cases – so experts can focus on what they do 
best— deliver care” (IBM 2018).8 
 
                                                          
8 It is worth noticing that when IBM says that the use of Watson allows the experts to focus on delivering care, they 
seem to imply that a reaonable usage of Watson may go beyond delegation of mere decision-support. However, as we 
shall see below, it is a good question  whether studies of congruence-rates with human experts are at all apt to be used 
in support of delegation of decision-making to Watson. 
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The idea is that, even if Watson performed just as well as human doctors rather than better – which 
would mean that there would be no argument in favour of using Watson from the point of view of 
strategic delegation – there might be other independent arguments in favour of using such 
technological systems coming from economic delegation.  
Once we have introduced and understood the distinction between strategic delegation and economic 
delegation, we can then also see that performance is crucial but is also not the whole story – there is 
obviously a context which contributes to performance evaluation. And it is in fact the familiar 
distributive context of efficiencies within limited resources. That’s one thing that technology does 
not change, even though it might alleviate the healthcare burden – at least if we delegate 
responsibly. 
In addressing question #1 we have learned about at least two important distinctions which are 
relevant to the ethical evaluation of our case study: the distinction between decision-making and 
decision-support which speaks to which precise tasks are being delegated and the distinction 
between strategic delegation and economic delegation which speaks to the different reasons for 
delegation. We can also begin to see how there might be an internal connection between our two 
distinctions. We said above that cancer treatment is something we care and should care deeply 
about, and that therefore we should not hand over control in the form of regular decision-making 
capacities to technologies like Watson. And we raised the possible objection that we shouldn’t a 
priori rule out any possible delegation of tasks, since whether we should delegate or not ought to 
depend on whether the machine outperforms the human experts. But what kind of outperforming is 
relevant here? Is it the one connected to strategic reason or the one connected to economic reasons? 
The ultimate reason why we care about which cancer treatment we recommend to the patient is that 
we want the patient to receive the best possible recommendation, and not that we want to provide 
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recommendations in a way that saves resources. If, for instance, we could know that Watson was 
significantly better at estimating the patient outcomes of different treatment, then this might speak 
in favor of delegating more control to Watson.9 This tells us that if are we looking for reasons that 
could tell in favor of delegating even the decision competence to an AI-system like Watson, then 
we should be looking for strategic reason.  
These tools in hand, we are now ready to address the crucial question #2 about Watson’s 
performance.  
 
Question #2: How do we measure Watson’s performance? Problems of Concordance 
As we have just seen different levels of performance becomes relevant dependent on whether one is 
arguing for delegation to Watson for strategic or for economic reason. For us to have strategic 
reasons for delegating we must have reason to think Watson outperforms human experts, whereas 
economic reasons only require that Watson lives up to the standard of the best human experts or at 
least approximates that standard. Often arguments for the delegation of a task to a certain 
technology present a mix of the two kinds of reasons, it is, however, important to keep in mind that 
the two kinds of reasons can function independently of one another. We may have purely strategic 
reasons to implement a health technology in cases where the technology will raise the quality of the 
treatment but without any economic benefit. And we may have purely economic reasons in cases 
where the technology will save us precious resources but without improving the quality of the 
treatment. It is paramount that we do not confuse these two kinds of reasons, because this could 
                                                          
9 Many thanks to Isaac Wagner for alerting us to the kind of objection discussed here and for raising this particular 
version of it. 
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mislead us into thinking that we have better a reason for delegating a task to a given technology 
than we in fact have. 
So what do we know about the performance level of Watson? Here are some results from two of the 
first attempts to measure the performance-level of Watson, both of which measured how concordant 
Watson’s recommendations are with the recommendations of a specific group of oncology experts:  
   
Overall, treatment recommendations were concordant in 96.4% of lung, 81.0% of colon 
and 92.7% of rectal cancer cases. By tumour stage, treatment recommendations were 
concordant in 88.9% of localized and 97.9% of metastatic lung cancer, 85.5% of 
localized and 76.6% of metastatic colon cancer, and 96.8% of localized and 80.6% of 
metastatic rectal cancer (Somashekhar et al 2017). 
 
 
 
The overall concordance rate was 83%; 89% for colorectal, 91% for lung, 76% for 
breast, and 78% for gastric cancer. Similar concordance rates were observed when 
retrospective and prospective cases were analyzed separately. Discordance was 
attributable in part to local oncologists’ preferences for non-U.S. guidelines for certain 
cancers, especially gastric cancer (Suwanvecho et al 2017). 
 
Concordance with expert oncologists is used both as a selling point by IBM, as we saw under Q1, 
and as the most significant quality parameter in the attempts to scientifically test the system. This 
make it pertinent to ask exactly what we can learn from such studies.  But before we address this 
crucial question, there are a few things to note about these two early studies about Watson’s 
performance. First of all – and easiest of all – we should point out that the first of these studies 
discloses funding from IBM, namely the company which develops and markets Watson; hardly 
independent funding, in short (you can find the relevant finding disclosures here).10 
                                                          
10 https://coi.asco.org/Report/ViewAbstractCOI?id=193610 
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In fact, there are IBM affiliations also in the other study, but those appear to be co-authors who are 
IBM employees; while that might also lead to some questions, some level of collaboration is 
probably to be expected in these early studies, even if just because of access to the technology. We 
are not claiming that these funding disclosures and affiliations disqualify those studies, but it is 
important to be aware of this particular kind of small print. 
Secondly, while Watson has been developed, as we have already seen, as a collaborative effort 
between IBM and the Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center in New York, the two studies have 
been carried out in different healthcare systems (India and Thailand). This element of diversity 
raises its own complex medical, economic and political questions, which we will address later. 
Thirdly, it is worth noting that what is meant by concordance in these studies is that the treatment 
suggestion of the oncology experts was to be found amongst the treatments suggested by Watson in 
either the “Recommended” category or the “For Consideration” category. In other words, 
concordance does not necessarily mean that there was a match between the treatment recommended 
by the human experts and the treatments Watson categorized as recommended. 
 Having made these three preliminary points about those studies, what about the data itself? What 
do these studies tell us about Watson? Is it sufficiently reliable, or should we actually be scared 
about delegating medical decisions or decision-support to it? With concordance levels between a 
minimum of 76% and a maximum of 97.9%, what should we make of Watson’s performance? Is 
76% good enough? Is 97.9% exceptional?  
12 
 
Numbers alone – as it is often the case – don’t tell us very much.11 And before we can even begin to 
answer such questions, we need to address a more fundamental question: Should we be using 
concordance as an evaluative standard in the first place?  
The answer to this first question crucially depends on whether we are interested in evaluating the 
potential economic or the potential strategic reasons for delegating tasks to Watson. Given that 
these studies compare the performance of Watson with that of human experts, one might think that 
the studies could serve as ammunition for strategic delegation. However, as we shall see in fact the 
opposite is the case.  Assuming that delegating to Watson will save us resources, a high degree of 
concordance seems exactly fit to play the role of an economic reason for delegation. What matters 
for economic reasons is that the level of performance of the technology we delegate to is on par 
with the human experts whose tasks are being delegated. And a high degree of concordance can 
exactly serve as evidence for the claim that Watson performs at a level similar to that of the human 
experts. 
However, if we are looking for strategic reasons, concordance does not seem to be the right 
measure. A high degree of concordance can at most show us that the system is no worse than the 
relevant human experts; it cannot, just on its own, serve as evidence for the superiority of the 
recommendations provided by Watson. In fact, if we are aiming for a system that can out-perform 
humans then per definition we must also be aiming for a system that to some extent should be in 
disagreement with the relevant human experts. Only so would there be a chance that the system gets 
right what the humans gets wrong. The problem with the present studies, however, is that we do not 
know if the lack of concordance is due to human failing where the system succeeds, the system 
failing where humans succeeds, or both parties being perhaps equally far from succeeding in the 
                                                          
11 It should be mentioned that other local studies show a lower congruence rate. For instance, studies from South Korea 
show a relatively low level of congruence (~ 40%) (Choi et al. 2019; Lee et al. 2018). The involved South Korean 
hospitals ended up not implementing Watson (Choi 2018). 
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finding the optimal treatment. In short, we lack a standard that is itself independent of both the 
verdict of the relevant group of experts and the output of the system, and yet is a standard we have 
reason to believe is more objective than both Watson and the experts.12  
Could we get our hands on such a more objective standard? In some cases of using IA-systems for 
diagnostic purposes, it makes perfect sense to speak of a more objective standard. We can test the 
reliability of respectively the IA-system and the human experts by asking them to make a diagnosis 
of cases where we already know, via methods that are more or less bullet proof, what the correct 
answer is. However, when it comes to what the best cancer treatment to a given patient is, it is not 
so easy to provide such an independent “gold standard”.      
Probably our most reliable method for establishing the likely outcome of a given treatment to a 
concrete patient is by comparison with the results of prospective randomized clinical trials 
involving patients similar to the concrete patient on relevant parameters. However, in many 
concrete cases we do not possess sufficient evidence-basis from such trials to establish with a high 
degree of certainty the likely outcome of different kinds of treatment. This is one reason why we 
can find disagreement between experts when it comes to assessment of which treatment should be 
recommended to a given patient. And it is part of the reason why IBM uses the recommendations of 
the experts at MSK Cancer Center as input when training Watson.13  
Even if we had much more relevant clinical trials available the application of such general results to 
a particular case would still involve an ineradicable element of clinical judgement in a way that for 
instance certain methods used as gold standards in a diagnostic context does not. However, this 
                                                          
12 See Tupasela and Di Nucci (submitted) for a further discussion of this problem of concordance. 
13 See the critical news article by Ross and Swetlitz (2017) for a description of the training sessions with Watson. Also 
see the already cited Somashekhar 2018: “Finally, lack of concordance does not necessarily provide evidence regarding 
whether the MMDT or WFO was ‘correct’ in its recommendation. As previously discussed, disagreements can have 
many valid explanations such as differences in how patients with comorbidities and increasing age are treated. There is 
no ‘gold standard’ beyond expert opinion, which studies have shown can vary profoundly during the evaluation of 
CDSSs.” 
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should not lead us to rule out that an AI-system such as Watson could become better than the best 
human expert at predicting the outcome of specific treatments in concrete cases. If Watson, as IBM 
hopes for, becomes able to detect otherwise hidden relevant patterns through the processing of 
enormous data-sets, this capacity might end up beating the clinical experience of human experts. 
Our epistemic question is, however, how we could ever know that the machine outperforms the 
human. In lack of an independent gold standard, perhaps the best indication we could have for such 
outperforming would be that the human experts on due consideration of the evidence presented by 
the machine in support of its alternative proposals are willing, in a significant amount of cases, to 
admit that the system’s recommendations should be followed. However, that is not where we are at 
now, where it is to a large extend the human experts at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center 
who, by feeding Watson with their preferred recommendations, set the standard for Watson.   
To be fair, the fact that concordance-studies cannot serve as strategic reasons for implementing 
Watson, does not imply that there are no strategic reasons in favor of using Watson. Even if we 
assume that Watson’s recommendations are not as superior to the human experts, they might still 
help qualify the decisions made. Given Watson’s ability to scan massive amounts of scientific 
literature in a few seconds, it’s only to be expected that it might come up with otherwise unknown 
evidence that can confirm or challenge the human experts’ initial judgement thereby enhancing the 
quality of the final decision. Here, however, it is a specific part of the task of providing decision 
support that Watson might be better at than humans, and not the task of providing treatment 
recommendations as such. This is important because it means that we are a still far from having a 
general strategic reason in favor of delegating treatment decisions making to Watson. And in so far 
as what is needed if we are to so much as consider delegating decision control to a system like 
Watson is, as we have argued under Q1, exactly strategic reasons, we can conclude that we are not 
in possession of any reasons for considering such outsourcing at the moment.  
15 
 
All these complexities and epistemic difficulties should not let us lose sight of a much more simple 
observation: if Watson delivers advice that the oncology scientific community agrees is mistaken 
and less than safe – then that must mean that this particular medical AI system is not yet fit for 
purpose. And there is evidence that Watson has in fact proven problematic in such a manner: there 
were multiple media reports in 2018 according to which IBM’s own internal documents suggested 
that Watson had often given ‘unsafe and incorrect’ advice.14 Furthermore, not all concordance 
studies show high concordance rates. Furthermore, in concordance studies that show a high degree 
of concordance, we still lack a good analysis of what might explain the dis-concordance we 
nevertheless find in such studies.  
 
Questions #3: Additional risks of delegating to algorithms 
So far we have focused on epistemic issues about how to evaluate the performance of medical AI 
systems such as Watson. But on top of the uncertainty and difficulties that the epistemic issues in 
the previous section bring, what other risks are there with medical AI? One problem is what in the 
literature is often referred to as the problem of ‘black box’ algorithms (Pasquale 2015) and the 
related issue of opacity, which is in a slogan the idea that we don’t understand how these algorithms 
function. Another easy way of understanding the opacity and black box concerns is to state the 
obvious semantic fact that opacity is the opposite of transparency. And that transparency – also as a 
                                                          
14 See for example the following three, especially the first one which appears to be the direct source of the other media 
reports: 
https://www.statnews.com/2018/07/25/ibm-watson-recommended-unsafe-incorrect-treatments/ 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2018/07/27/ibm-watson-ai-criticised-giving-unsafe-cancer-treatment-advice/ 
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-6001141/IBMs-Watson-suggested-inaccurate-unsafe-treatment-
recommendations-cancer-patients.html 
https://gizmodo.com/ibm-watson-reportedly-recommended-cancer-treatments-tha-1827868882 
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necessary condition for informed consent (Di Nucci 2018, Chapter 6) – is particularly crucial when 
it comes to medicine and healthcare, so that opacity concerns have particular weight for medical AI.  
Burrell (2016) identifies three different kinds of opacity concerns for machine learning algorithms:  
(i) opacity in terms of proprietary protection or corporate secrecy;  
(ii) opacity as technical illiteracy (lack of ability to read the code); and  
(iii) opacity as a “mismatch between mathematical procedures of machine learning 
algorithms and human styles of semantic interpretation” (Burrell 2016: 3).  
The three kinds of opacity refer to three different ways in which we might be left in the dark as to 
how an AI-system solves its task. Opacity due to proprietary protection and corporate secrecy is a 
real concern in cases like IBM’s Watson where the company’s economic interests can be in obvious 
conflict with our interest in having the best possible basis for a rigorous scientific testing of the 
reliability of the system. Opacity due to technical illiteracy becomes relevant here since most 
doctors do not have the technical knowledge to understand the inner workings of Watson. This 
could be said to be the natural result of sensible division of labour, but because we do not have a 
simple objective “gold standard” against which we can measure Watson’s output, it matters that 
doctors understand how Watson reached its conclusions, in terms of reasons they themselves can 
recognize as good reasons. Without such acknowledgement by human experts of the rationality of 
Watson’s conclusions, we would basically be putting our trust in Watson blindly. The third kind of 
opacity has to do with exactly the principled possibility of translating the “rationality” of machine 
learning algorithms into a kind of reasoning that can be followed by humans. The worry is that the 
complexity of such systems’ pattern recognition might rise to a level, where it is no longer just a 
lack of technical skill that can make them opaque but rather a proper incommensurability between 
the workings of system and the way humans reason via natural language. This is a worry that is of 
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huge practical and theoretical importance, but also one that it would take us to far from our specific 
focus to pursue further here.  
Generally, we can say that a high degree of epistemic transparency, allowing the human experts to 
check whether Watson’s recommendations are grounded in good evidence is of utmost importance 
since we have no way of shortcutting this element of human evaluation via an independent 
reliability measure. It remains to be seen whether this possibility of checking will decrease, perhaps 
for principled reasons, as the capacity of Watson to detect patterns in huge datasets increases.  
Watson doesn’t just solve a theoretical task, as for instance figuring out what a patient’s most 
probable diagnoses is, but also gives practical recommendations as to which treatment should be 
offered. This means that it is not just the epistemic standards of Watson that need to be transparent, 
but also what Watson so to speak values as a good outcome of a treatment. This value-element 
comes with its own risks that go beyond the opacity issues above. McDougall (2019) has for 
example emphasized that currently Watson’s main criterion is ‘disease-free survival’; as in, each 
option is ranked according to the chances of ‘disease-free survival’ and those numbers are based on 
existing evidence within the medical literature surveyed by Watson’s algorithm.  
Here it is helpful to focus on ‘disease-free survival’ because even such a basic and seemingly 
uncontroversial criterion poses fundamental questions: should ‘disease-free survival’ always be the 
fundamental goal of treatment, no matter the costs? The whole field of palliative care and end-of-
life decision making testifies to the fact that ‘disease-free survival’ statistics might not always be 
the whole story.15 
                                                          
15 More on these life and death issues in Di Nucci 2018, Chapter 5. Here we could alternatively think in terms of 
QUALYS, Quality-Adjusted-Life-Years (again thanks to Isaac Wagner for the suggestion).  
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The problem, though, is not only which variable we settle on or on which grounds we choose a 
certain variable over others – those decisions are, after all, contested and difficult whether or not 
artificial intelligence is involved. The additional problem that the involvement of algorithms brings 
to the table is that of altering the dialectic of contested variables such as ‘disease-free survival’. 
Once IBM chooses ‘disease-free survival’ for Watson then already that corporate decision alone 
shifts the power dynamics around oncological decision-making by making a particular option that 
used to be contested the new default (similarly to the concern that smartphone and app developers 
make design choices which set a particular (perhaps non-ideal) option as the default and thus have a 
huge (negative) impact on how humans interact with the tech they have designed). 
Put it another way: numbers already have the advantage (especially in a technological society) of us 
being able to operationalize them; and this advantage becomes entrenched when powerful actors 
choose variables that can be operationalized over variables that are more difficult to operationalize. 
And the very reason for choosing one variable over another is obviously whether it can be 
operationalized. We have come full-circle but we have to be careful not to do so by begging the 
question: namely the decisive reason why we choose one variable over another cannot be alone the 
possibility of operationalizing that particular variable, in this case ‘disease-free survival’ chances. 
Otherwise technology risks silencing the lively debate around end-of-life decision making, for 
example. More broadly, technology would then end up justifying itself if a certain variable is only 
valuable because it can be operationalized and is thereby tech-valuable, so to speak. In a slogan, 
there must be value to it beyond its value to technology. 
There are other risks associated with Watson which do not depend on whether or not it is successful 
or on how to measure its possible success or failure. One particularly interesting risk that we want 
to focus on here is Watson’s global target: as we pointed out, the early evidence on concordance for 
Watson comes often from second- or third-world healthcare systems. On the one hand, that’s great 
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news: if through software we can bring medical expertise within oncology to countries and 
healthcare systems which would otherwise not have the resources to develop such expertise 
themselves, then Watson brings with it great developmental promise in terms of global health and 
global justice and we should celebrate that.  
On the other hand, though, a few cautionary notes that must be stressed: first of all, if those 
healthcare systems didn’t previously have access to such medical expertise within oncology because 
of lack of funds, buying Watson licenses might end up exacerbating their financial problems. Here 
we must also consider the fact that – in a country like India say - scare resources might be better 
invested in medical education than foreign technology, at least from a long-term sustainability point 
of view.  
Secondly, if those countries and healthcare systems did not previously have the relevant oncology 
expertise, on which grounds are they going to be able to assess Watson? In such cases, it is clear 
that concordance cannot be the correct epistemic measure since the point of introducing Watson 
would be to improve on their current expertise in oncology, i.e. what we are looking for are 
strategic, not economic reasons for adopting Watson. But we must also be careful that they will not 
be put under unduly pressure to accept the authority of outside expertise resulting in a form of 
medical colonialism As long as Watson’s output is to a high degree the result of the training by 
local experts at MSK, we cannot expect Watson to for example take into account how cultural 
(including for instance eating habits) and environmental differences can make a difference to which 
treatment should be recommended.  
In conclusion to this section we want to add a fourth risk category on top of the opacity-related 
risks, the value-related risks and the risks related to the politics of globalization in healthcare: the 
20 
 
risk that doctors, whether in New York, India or Copenhagen, start relying too much on Watson.16 
This phenomenon is well-known within aeronautics, where pilots are often asked to land planes 
manually even if the auto-pilot would be in a position to land (so-called ‘autoland’), just to make 
sure that pilots do not forget how to land a plane and are kept up to date through practice.17 
How do we make sure that oncologists do not end up relying too much on Watson? Surely before 
being able to answer this question we must deal with the related question of defining what would it 
mean for a human oncologist to use Watson too much. In the current implementation of Watson as 
we have described it here, we can all agree that using Watson too much would be constituted, for 
example, by a human oncologist uncritically passing on Watson’s advice to the patient without 
having herself first assessed and evaluated the plausibility of Watson’s advice. That way the 
oncologist would for example be culpable of contributing to perpetuating and exacerbating possible 
algorithmic biases about therapeutic options which may be contained within the code.18  
There are other possible scenarios that would count as relying too much on Watson: for example if 
a human oncologist would answer the patient’s questions on the soundness of a certain therapeutic 
options with “It was Watson’s first choice” or “It’s what Watson recommends”. This would be just 
as bad – in fact possibly actually worst – then if the doctor replied “It’s my first choice” or “It’s 
what I recommend”. Neither reaction meets basic communication and informed consent 
requirements but the latter at least allows the patient – in theory anyway – to challenge the source of 
                                                          
16 There has in fact already been a pilot trial of Watson at Rigshospitalet in Copenhagen. See Tupasela & Di Nucci 
(submitted) for more details on this trial. Based partly on poor congruence Rigshospitalet decided not to implement 
Watson (se also Ross & Swetlitz 2017). 
17 https://eu.usatoday.com/story/travel/columnist/cox/2014/02/09/autoland-low-visibility-landings/5283931/  
18 For more details on algorithmic bias, see the following: Hajian et al. 2016, Bozdag 2013, Baeza-Yates 2016, 
Kirkpatrick 2016, Lambrecht & Tucker 2018, and Danks & London 2017. 
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the advice, the oncologist with whom they are talking; while the former defers to an absent 
authority – the hidden algorithm – that the patient can neither see nor be expected to understand. 
There are also more subtle ways in which oncologists might end up relying too much on Watson: 
they might, for example, become habituated to Watson and to certain outcomes that its algorithms 
deliver, so that the human oncologists through habituation would end up trusting Watson’s 
outcomes too much and questioning them too little. That would be a particularly frightening 
prospect because algorithmic bias would generate further human bias thereby creating a whole 
vicious circle of human and technological biases and mistakes.  
Even though it will be difficult and beyond the scope here to precisely define what exactly will 
count as relying too much on Watson, we can agree that there is such a thing as relying too much on 
it, as the examples above show. And that is why it is important to establish processes that ensure 
that human oncologists do not rely too much on Watson’s authority and are always capable to 
critically assess and evaluate Watson’s advice.  
 
Question #4 and concluding remarks 
In conclusion, we can now at least attempt to answer the basic ethical question of what Watson is 
good for and what we ought not to use Watson for. We have distinguished between delegating 
oncology decision-making itself to Watson and only delegating decision-support (namely advice for 
the clinician) to Watson and we have recommended that, at least at this early stage, only the former 
(if at all) should be delegated to an algorithmic system such as Watson.  
We have further distinguished between so-called ‘strategic delegation’ in which the aim is to 
improve performance and ‘economic delegation’ in which the aim to is have comparable 
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performance for less invested resources. While we have identified multiple possible problems and 
risks with ‘strategic delegation’ to Watson – including the concordance issues that we have 
discussed at length – the system appears to be more promising in terms of ‘economic delegation’, 
namely if we restrict its use to basic tasks and thereby free some of the human oncologist’s precious 
time.  
Finally, we have identified possible problems and risks that are independent of issues concerning 
the soundness of Watson’s advice and how to measure whether Watson’s advice is in fact sound; 
risks related to such issues as opacity, transparency, end-of-life decision-making and also global 
health justice; and finally algorithmic bias and the risk that healthcare systems end up relying too 
much on Watson thereby losing critical human skills. 
We hope that this attempt at laying the groundwork for a full ethical assessment of Watson has 
provided a useful case study in at least three general directions: in the first instance, how to decide 
whether a particular information technology system can be safely and successfully adopted with 
healthcare; secondly, how ethical questions often depend upon and are intertwined with other 
complex philosophical questions such as the epistemological ones we have identified in this 
chapter; thirdly and more broadly, we hope to have provided a practical example of how to use 
ethics and philosophy in the real world.19 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 Many thanks to Isaac Wagner for written comments on an earlier draft.  
23 
 
References 
Baeza-Yates, R. (2016, May). Data and algorithmic bias in the web. In Proceedings of the 8th ACM 
Conference on Web Science (pp. 1-1). ACM. 
Bozdag, E. (2013). Bias in algorithmic filtering and personalization. Ethics and information 
technology, 15(3), 209-227. 
Burrell J 2016 How the machine ‘thinks’: Understanding opacity in machine learning algorithms. 
Big Data & Society 3(1) :1-12. 
Youn I Choi, Jun-won Chung, Kyoung Oh Kim, et al. 2019. Concordance Rate between Clinicians 
and Watson for Oncology among Patients with Advanced Gastric Cancer: Early, Real-World 
Experience in Korea.  Canadian Journal of Gastroenterology and Hepatology, 2019, Article ID 
8072928. https://doi.org/10.1155/2019/8072928. 
Choi, MH. 2018. “Major Hospitals in S. Korea not very interested in Watson.2 March 28, 2018. 
http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=21308. Visited May 14. 
Danks, D., & London, A. J. (2017). Algorithmic bias in autonomous systems. In Proceedings of the 
Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (pp. 4691-4697). 
Di Nucci E. 2018. Ethics in Healthcare. Rowman & Littlefield (danish edition : Ethics4Medics, 
Munksgaard 2018).  
Di Nucci E. 2019. Should we be afraid of medical AI? Journal of Medical Ethics (forthcoming).  
Di Nucci E. The Control Paradox (book manuscript).  
Domingos P 2015 The Master Algorithm. Basic Books. 
Fry H. 2018. Hello World. Penguin.  
Grote & Di Nucci (forthcoming) Algorithmic Decision-Making and the Problem of Control. In: 
Beck B & Kühler M (eds) Anthropology, Technology and Responsibility. Metzler.  
Hajian, S., Bonchi, F., & Castillo, C. (2016). Algorithmic bias: From discrimination discovery to 
fairness-aware data mining. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGKDD international conference on 
knowledge discovery and data mining (pp. 2125-2126). ACM. 
Kirkpatrick, K. (2016). Battling algorithmic bias: How do we ensure algorithms treat us 
fairly? Communications of the ACM, 59(10), 16-17. 
24 
 
Lambrecht, A., & Tucker, C. E. (2018). Algorithmic bias? An empirical study into apparent gender-
based discrimination in the display of STEM career ads. 
Lee et al. 2018. Assessing Concordance With Watson for Oncology, a Cognitive Computing 
Decision Support System for Colon Cancer Treatment in Korea. JCO Clinical Cancer Informatics, 
2(2): 1-8. 
McDougall R. 2019. Computer knows best? The need for value-flexibility in medical AI. Journal of 
Medical Ethics 45 (3): 156. 
Mittelstadt, B. D., & Floridi, L. (Eds.). (2016). The ethics of biomedical big data (Vol. 29). 
Springer. 
Pasquale F 2015. The Black Box Society. Harvard UP. 
Santoni, F. & Van den Hoven, J. (2018). Meaningful Human Control over Autonomous Systems: A 
Philosophical Account. Frontiers in Robotics and AI, 5, 15. 
Somashekhar et al 2017. J Clin Oncol 35, 2017 (suppl; abstr 8527) 
Susskind R & Susskind D (2015), The Future of the Professions. Oxford UP.  
Suwanvecho et al 2017. J Clin Oncol 35, 2017 (suppl; abstr 6589) 
Thaddeus Beck et al 2017. J Clin Oncol 35, 2017 (suppl; abstr 6501) 
Tegmark M. 2017. Life 3.0. Penguin.  
Topol E. 2019. Deep Medicine. Basic Books.  
Tupasela A & Di Nucci E. (submitted). The Problem of Concordance as Evidence in Oncology 
Decision-Support Systems. AI & Society. 
Wajcman J 2017 Automation : is it really different this time ? British Journal of Sociology 68 (1) : 
119-127 
 
 
 
25 
 
STUDY QUESTIONS 
I) What is the difference between decision-making and decision-support? And more 
specifically: what is the difference between delegating decision-making to a 
technological system and delegating decision-support to a technological system? 
II) What is the difference between strategic delegation and economic delegation? 
III) List at least three possible risks of Watson and assess the likelihood and plausibility of 
each of these three risks.  
IV) Discuss, also based on the Watson case study, whether we are increasingly losing the 
human touch in healthcare.  
V) Compare the case of Watson with another recent technological implementation within 
healthcare. 
 
